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Abstract
In a refreshing mathematical investigation, Mark (2018) shows that status hierarchy
may facilitate the emergence of cooperation in groups. Despite the contribution, the
present paper notes that there are limitations in Mark’s model that makes it less
realistic than it could in explaining real-world experiences. Consequently, we present a
more generalized modified framework in which his model is a special case, by developing
and introducing a new hierarchy measure into the model to estimate the cooperation
level in a set of hierarchical structures omitted in Mark’s work yet common in everyday
life–those with multiple leaders. We derived the conditions under which cooperation
can emerge in these groups, and verified our analytical predictions in agent-based
computer simulations. In so doing, not only does our model elaborate on its predecessor
and support Mark’s general prediction. For theory, our work further reveals two novel
phenomena of group cooperation: Both the relative number of cooperators to defectors
in groups and the assortativity among these different roles can backfire; they are not
always the higher, the better for cooperation to thrive. For methodology, the hierarchy
measure developed and our model using the measure may also be applied in future
research on a wide range of related topics.
1 INTRODUCTION
Group cooperation and status inequality have each received longstanding attention in so-
ciology. While they are often discussed in independent lines of research (Kollock, 1998;
Correll and Ridgeway, 2006; Fehr and Gintis, 2007; Sauder et al., 2012), scholars have re-
cently started investigating both topics in an integrated view (Simpson and Willer, 2015).
Specifically, researchers argue that hierarchy may benefit the emergence of cooperation
in groups over evolutionary history against defection (Hechter, 1987; Whitmeyer, 2007;
Willer, 2009; Mark, 2018), thus linking two lines of investigation into one. Take the leader-
follower status for example. Ample evidence from field and experimental work have shown
that people behave more cooperatively in groups with leaders than without (Luo et al.,
∗Corresponding author. Email: chiangys@gate.sinica.edu.tw
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2007; Olken, 2010; Hamman et al., 2011; Grossman and Baldassarri, 2012; Bolsen et al.,
2014).
Compared to the fruitful empirical demonstrations of the phenomenon, theoretical explana-
tions for the phenomenon–that is, the mechanisms through which status hierarchy induces
group cooperation in evolution–have nonetheless remained relatively untouched. Tackling
this gap in the literature, we believe the evolutionary game (EVG) theory may contribute to
the advance of theory. EVG is a tool that not only biologists (Nowak, 2006) but also social
scientists (Bendor and Swistak, 2001; Bergstrom, 2002) utilize to formalize explanations
of the emergence of human behavior and social institution, such as cooperation and status
hierarchy. In particular, EVG aims to identify the conditions under which the behavior of
interest–represented by a strategy in a game–comes into being and remains stable against
alternative behaviors in a given social context–a set of game settings. The emergence of
the target behavior is measured by its evolutionary fitness, in the sense that the more
benefits accrued to the behavior, the more (likely) it would be adopted by an actor, or by
more actors. As far as cooperation is concerned, scientists have used the EVG framework
to pin down an array of mechanisms by which the free-riding problem can be mitigated in
cooperation dilemmas (Nowak, 2006). We hence follow the literature and apply EVG to
examine whether and how status hierarchy facilitates cooperation in groups.
Guiding our investigation, the paper of (Mark, 2018) provides a pioneering and refresh-
ing answer to our research question. In his model, conditional cooperators–called status
cooperators–first engage in a pursuit of leadership. They then cooperate, fully, if one and
only one of them surfaces to take the leader position; they defect otherwise if no leader is
chosen. In comparison to cooperators, status defectors never pursue the leader role, nor
do they cooperate with others. Using this EVG, Mark demonstrates that, even though
defectors seem to be the advantaged as they always free-ride on the efforts of cooperators,
it is possible for status cooperators to outperform defectors in evolution history as long
as one of cooperators becomes the leader and make their fellow cooperators to cooperate.
Finally, (Mark, 2018) reports that this status-dependent cooperation behavior is even more
likely to emerge against defection when the group size is smaller than larger, and when the
group formation is more assortative (i.e., actors are disproportionately likely to interact
with same-role others) than random.
Building off its merits and insights, we however note that Mark’s EVG is limited too and,
specifically, does not take into account the situation in which multiple leaders emerge from
cooperators and lead the group in a parallel fashion. As the late sociologist Roger Gould
argued, “It is evident that most social hierarchies lie between the two extremes of complete
equality [i.e., no leader selected] and winner-take-all inequality [i.e., one leader only].”
(Gould, 2002, p. 1149). In short, real-world status difference is not always, following
Mark’s terms, clear and apparent. We therefore tackle the issue in the present paper,
therefore extending the investigation of Mark.
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In particular, below we show that stipulating status structure in groups to be either no-
leader or single-leader makes Mark’s model sometimes underestimate the possibility that
cooperation can emerge in groups, and other times overestimate the same possibility. Prac-
tically, we build upon his model by introducing into the model a continuous measure of
status “hierarchicalness” to capture the influences of multi-leader status structures ex-
cluded in Mark’s work. The measure allows us to extrapolate the extent to which group
members cooperate at any given level of hierarchicalness. In other words, we present a
more generalized framework in which Mark’s original model is a special case. In compari-
son to Mark’s (2018) reliance on analytical solutions, we also verify our EVG by computer
simulations; the code is provided online.
In addition, two novel phenomena not revealed in Mark’s work are reported using our more
generalized model. For one, according to Mark’s model equations, his model would predict
that, in hierarchy, the more status cooperators in a group relative to defectors, the more
viable cooperation is a behavioral strategy in evolution against defection. This extension of
Mark’s work is appealing, and we verified it in the present paper. Nonetheless, we further
show that the prediction is true only when the existence of hierarchy is an either-or issue
as in Mark’s model, that is, when there is either a clear hierarchy of only one leader, or
no hierarchy and no leader at all. By contrast, when hierarchicalness is conceptualized as
a more nuanced continuous construct as in our generalized framework, the cooperator-to-
defector ratio only helps with cooperation up to a point, and then it backfires. In other
words, we report the possibility of an ironic effect of having too many cooperators in a
group on generating cooperation in the group.
Secondly, we investigate the interdependence between the relative number of cooperators
to defectors and the assortativity between the two roles. To the issue, Mark demonstrates
that, much like the relative number of cooperators, assortativity increases the evolutionary
strength of cooperation against defection. We replicated the prediction in our generalized
model. However, we also found that the benefit of assortativity comes with a cost: It
may compromise the benefit of the number of cooperators. Sometimes, when the degree of
assortativity is large enough, it may even reverse the effect of the cooperator-to-defector
ratio, making it detrimental but not beneficial to the evolution of cooperation. The im-
plication, then, is that not only can increase the ratio of cooperators in a group backfires
at some point, but the increase might also be simply destructive at any point given high
assortativity, despite that assortativity is commonly thought of as a “protector” of coop-
eration in the literature. Below, we detail our generalized group cooperation model with a
rigorous formalism and nuanced cooperative properties.
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2 SOCIAL HIERARCHY AND COOPERATION: AN EVO-
LUTIONARY ACCOUNT
2.1 Status hierarchy
Status inequality is not only ubiquitous in human societies, but also prevalent in the
societies of many species of social animals (Chase, 1985; Sapolsky, 2005; Sauder et al.,
2012). Biologists argue that social hierarchy, particularly the dominance type, is a result of
constant competition for valuable resources such as food and mating opportunities (Hobson,
2019). For humans, social hierarchy and status inequality are further suggested as a cause of
social and health problems (Hemingway et al., 1997; Burns et al., 2014). Given the negative
consequences of inequality, it is thus puzzling why it persists in the real world.
At least two reasons have been proposed to address this puzzle. First, scholars argue that,
even though humans are mostly fairness-minded, perfect equality is never their ultimate
goal; people do desire some if not overly steep hierarchy (Starmans et al., 2017). Support-
ing this idea, evidence suggests that people would accept a certain degree of inequality in
exchange for other types of personal benefits (Kuziemko et al., 2014). Research has also
shown that once a status hierarchy is formed, people not only tend to live with it but also,
sometimes, strive to protect this status quo (Xie et al., 2017). Secondly, scholars propose
that social hierarchy can do more than the lesser evil and actually be beneficial to social
coordination and cooperation. For instance, evolutionary psychologists attribute the emer-
gence of leadership and, therefore, the leader-follower status disparity among animals and
humans to its potential function of exerting social influences, especially in but not limited
to risky situations and critical group-wide challenges such as hunting for food and fighting
with rivalry tribes (Van Vugt, 2006). In support of the argument, experimental studies
have shown that people tend to behave more cooperatively with leaders than without (Luo
et al., 2007; Olken, 2010; Hamman et al., 2011; Grossman and Baldassarri, 2012; Bolsen
et al., 2014). It is also found that cooperative actors receive more status approval and
are elected as leaders more often than do non-cooperative members of the group (Willer,
2009). Because of these collective functions, a social hierarchy may therefore hold in human
societies.
2.2 Mark’s (2018) model: contributions, limitations, and our exten-
sions
In his model, Mark (2018) examines one specific hierarchical structure in how likely coop-
eration would emerge in it over an evolutionary game. The structure features two types of
actors: status cooperators (SC) and defectors (D). SCs pursue the leader position whereas
the Ds do not, and the leadership is determined in a process of intent signaling: Every SC
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signals whether they are interested in being the leader with a given probability, and the
hierarchy is settled when exactly one SC shows the interest and becomes the leader. The
process repeats if multiple SCs express the interest until one and the only leader is chosen
or none of SCs signals the intent to lead.
Despite its originality, Mark’s model is however limited and overly simplified, because
single-leader hierarchy is merely one of the various hierarchical structures we witness in
the real world. As such, the goal of the present paper is to generalize Mark’s work over
an extra dimension of the leader-follower structure: the number of leaders. In Mark’s
model, the dimension takes only two extreme values: 0 for no hierarchy at all, and 1 for
total dominance of the one leader. By contrast, we first developed and incorporated into
our model a measure of parallel competing leadership allocated to multiple leaders, and
then derived the implications of this attenuated status difference for cooperation in groups.
Below, let us first quickly summarize the part of Mark’s model that we built ours on.
In Mark’s original model, there are four events happening in one iteration of the game:
(1) the determination of the group; (2) preplay communication for leader selection; (3)
cooperators’ decisions of whether to contribute to the group; (4) the determination of
next generation of status cooperators and defectors based on the payoffs of the current
generation. Mark states that, in the phase of preplay signaling and formation of a status
hierarchy, in each round of signaling, every status cooperator signals the/high intend to
lead the group with probability 1n where n is the group size, and no/low such intend with
the complementary probability 1 − 1n ; every defector signals low intend. The signaling
repeats for rounds until a clear status hierarchy is reached, i.e., when there is no player
at the top, leader level, or when there is exactly one player at the level. Once the status
hierarchy is obvious with 0 or 1 player at the top level, the cooperators continue to decide
whether to contribute to the group. In Mark’s own words, “Each of the status cooperators
in a group signals one or more times until either a status hierarchy is apparent (i.e., exactly
one member of the group signaling high and all others signaling low) or a collective lack of
confidence and leadership is indicated (i.e., each member of the group signaling low on the
first round of signaling).” Following this setting, it is then reasonable to assume that when
there are more than 1 player at the top level, the group continues on preplay signaling,
and the process concludes when 0 or 1 player being at the top level.
To incorporate multi-leader structures into Mark’s model, we simply break his requirement
for hierarchy and allow hierarchies of any number of leaders nominated in the initial round
of preplay communication to proceed to the next phase of the cooperators’ deciding whether
to contribute to the group. Supporting the design empirically, organizational hierarchy
is known to take diverse forms in the real world, well beyond the either-or, one-or-no-
leader type studied by Mark. In professional sports, for instance, it is common to see
multiple star players on the same team and, indeed, on the court at the same time. In the
business domain, it is also normal to have multiple managers in the executive committee
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of a company, each of whom is ranked equally in the status hierarchy. Overall, then, it
seems crucial for us to include the continuous spectrum of structural hierarchicalness in
between the two extreme ends of the signal- and the no-leader case. Our decision to not
abandon multi-leader cases in the leader selection phase of the model also allows the model
to analyze some issues that cannot be analyzed in Mark’s work–e,g, the cost of repeated
structure formation and leadership negotiation, which is implicitly assumed to be zero
when multi-leader hierarchies are dropped without a cost in Mark’s model yet is common
and influential in the real world (Friedrich et al., 2009; Dust and Ziegert, 2012).
Practically, if the signaling process generates multiple leaders in a round in our model,
rather than dropping the round and starting all over as Mark’s model would, we estimate
the hierarchicalness of this–following his terminology–unapparent structure. We then es-
timate the downstream effects of this hierarchicalness in between that of no hierarchy at
all and of total dominance of the one leader, on the upcoming cooperation decisions of
cooperators in the group. To follow closely with Mark’s model and preserve it as a special
case in ours, we keep his model’s feature that perfect equality generates no cooperation
(from cooperators; defectors always defect) and total dominance generates unhesitating co-
operation. Consequently, the issue that follows is how to first gauge the hierarchicalness of
multi-leader structures when placing them in between the two extreme scenarios and then
transform the hierarchicalness measure into cooperators’ (un)certainty–the hesitation–to
(not) cooperate.
To address the question, we visited the literature of measuring hierarchicalness of organi-
zations, in search of an index that would meet the current needs. Specifically, a classic
approach to measuring hierarchicalness ranks individuals by their dominance, following the
idea that those who have a better winning rate and a larger winning differential over others
in contests–or simply, stronger dominance–are expected to be ranked higher on the ladder.
Traced back to the Bradley-Terry model (Bradley and Terry, 1952), this family of methods
has been modified to measure the status hierarchy in various organizations such as sports
competitions (Massey, 1997; Colley, 2002) and peer relations between teenagers (Martin,
1998; Levi Martin, 2009). Much like the first approach, an alternative way to measure
social hierarchy is also built upon the same idea of dominance while taking a root in the
social-network literature. From the network perspective, the dominance relation between a
pair of actors can be represented by a directed edge stemming from actor i to j, indicating
that i dominates j in a diagram along a dimension of interest such as aggression, attraction,
or prestige (Cheng et al., 2013). If the two actors are equal in status, their relationship
can be represented by an undirected edge otherwise. As such, this network diagram ap-
proach allows researchers to use social network toolkits to measure the hierarchicalness of
a group. For instance, Krackhardt proposed to measure the hierarchicalness of a group by
the number of directed edges out of the total number of edges, directed or undirected, in
the network (Krackhardt, 1994). In ethology, researchers have also used the prevalence of
cyclic subgraphs, wherein actor i dominates j, who then dominates k, who in turn domi-
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nates i (Shizuka and McDonald, 2012), to gauge hierarchicalness. That is, if this kind of
cycle is prevalent in a group, then the group is said to be less hierarchical than are the
groups wherein k does not dominate i and is always fixed at the bottom. Finally, Mones et
al. developed a hierarchicalness index by tracing the reachability of actors in the diagram
of dominance relations (Mones et al., 2012). When a group is highly hierarchical, such as
having a tree-like structure, the top actor–the root node–can reach all other nodes-actors
(directly or indirectly) in the network, whereas the bottom node–the branches–can not
reach any others, and those in between the top and the bottom can only reach those who
are below themselves. In contrast, in the least hierarchical structure–a cycle–everyone can
reach everyone else in time. The distribution of the reachability of nodes can consequently
reveal the hierarchicalness of the group of the nodes.
Drawing from the literature, in this paper, we adopted the index of Mones et al. (2012) and
modified it for Mark’s EVG (2018). We followed the tenet of Mark’s work that “the status
hierarchy is the key to how status behavior promotes social order” (line 4-5, p. 1607),
and then expanded on this idea by the hierarchicalness measure, so that the single-leader
hierarchy in Mark’s model becomes a special case of a more general model. Specifically,
Mark reasons that “when status behaviors combine to create a [clear, single-leader] status
hierarchy, they help the members of a group [fully] overcome a social dilemma. When
status behaviors do not [produce any leader and, thus, do not] create a status hierarchy,
they do not promote cooperation [at all]” (line 5-8, p. 1607). Accordingly, we applied
the chosen hierarchicalness measure to answer: If the single- and the no-leader structure
represent the most and the least hierarchical structure respectively and they render total
and zero cooperation among status cooperators respectively, what would be the level of
cooperation in a group whose hierarchicalness is in between these two types of extremes and
is measured by the index of (Mones et al., 2012)? We detail our calculation below.
3 THE MODEL
The section is organized as follows. First, we introduce the hierarchicalness measure of
(Mones et al., 2012). We then show how it is modified to fit into (Mark, 2018) EVG to de-
scribe a more general relationship between status hierarchy and group cooperation. Along
the way, we highlight the differences between Mark’s and our work, in the conditions under
which cooperation could emerge. Lastly, for ease of reading, we follow the presentation of
(Mark, 2018) to first assume random mixing (Section 3.2) before introducing assortative
mixing (Section 3.3) into the model.
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3.1 Hierarchical score and the cooperation probability Hn(x)
As mentioned, there are four phases in one iteration in Mark’s EVG: (1) the determination
of the group; (2) preplay communication among group members; (3) cooperators’ decisions
to contribute to the group or not; (4) the determination of the next generation of status
cooperators and defectors based on their payoffs from the current generation. We generalize
this model by allowing multi-leader hierarchies to pass phase (2) and, therefore, forcing
cooperators to make decisions on whether to contribute in such “unapparent” structures
in phase (3). Phases (1) and (4) are unchanged and, consequently, not discussed in detail
below; we focus on phases (2) and (3).
As in Mark’s model, there are two levels of hierarchy in our model to be formed from
preplay communication: the leaders at the top and the followers at the bottom. In the
process, every status cooperator similarly signals willingness to be a leader with probability
1
n and, hence, a lack of such intention with probability 1− 1n , or n−1n . If there is no player
expressing the interest in taking the leadership role at the top level, following Mark, it
is assumed that all status cooperators will not contribute to the group in the next phase
of the game, as will the defectors at the bottom level. From here, however, Mark posits
that status cooperators will only contribute and do so without hesitation if there is one
and only leader emerging. If there are more, he requires the hierarchy formation to start
over until a clear structure shows. To break from this requirement, we loosen the model
design by incorporating the possibility that leadership is often shared by many in the real
world (Selznick, 2011; Case and Maner, 2014; Eslen-Ziya and Erhart, 2015). Practically,
if there are multiple players signaling high versus low intention to lead the group, instead
of abandoning the round of leader selection, we retain the surfacing multi-leader structure
and allow status cooperators to still contribute, though this time, with a likelihood–some
hesitation. By so designing our EVG, then, not only is our model capable of studying more
forms of hierarchy as we set out to achieve; there will be no issue of the hidden costs of
failure for group members to agree upon a clear hierarchy (as is the case in Mark’s work),
because all multi-leader hierarchical statures are now considered a successful hierarchy
formation and the costs of leader selection become a natural part of the game. Finally, it
might be worth noting that the two extreme situations which Mark examines–that is, in
which either one or zero leader is established–are taken into account in our model as two
special cases out of all permitted hierarchical structures. Indeed, because Mark requires
that all status cooperators cooperate when there is one leader and none of them cooperate
when there is no leader, he sets up the boundaries of the cooperation probability of our
model. That is, when the group is the most hierarchical, with one above all, all will follow
and contribute with the highest cooperation probability of 1. By contrast, when the group
is the least hierarchical, with all on the same flat level, none will contribute, or, will do
so with the lowest cooperation probability of 0. Together, the two scenarios become the
upper and the lower limit of our model, implying that all other less apparent hierarchical
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structures that we sought to include should sit between these two extremes of cooperation
probability equal 0 or 1.
Following Mark’s theorizing, we assume that, when there are multiple leaders at the top
level and make the group’s hierarchy obscure, the leaders’ authority will become attenu-
ated and, therefore, relatively ineffective in terms of motivating cooperation in the group.
Importantly, not only is this assumption stems directly from Mark’s reasoning; it has been
supported in empirical studies. For instance, it has been documented that members of
multi-leader teams simply need more resources, e.g., time, to communicate and to agree
upon share goals (Rice, 2006). This then increases the risk of failing to achieve consensus
for which group members, especially subordinates, can work on together and cooperate
with one another. Further, even if leaders can enclose distinct domains of leadership by,
say, different specialties, allowing them to pursue independent objectives at the same time–
much as what we modeled–runs on the possibility that they would get into each other’s
way, competing for common resources such as material and human resources (Friedrich
et al., 2009). On the other hand, though organizing leaders into a larger system may help
them coordinate and therefore mitigate the problem (Dust and Ziegert, 2016), it implicitly
violates the idea of multi-leadership that we sought to investigate, as now the leaders are
also followers under something or someone greater. In terms of mathematics, this means
a reduction of the dimensionality of group leadership hidden behind a superficial constant
number of leaders in the group. Consequently, we use the clarity of hierarchicalness of
a group as the proxy to the likelihood that status cooperators can coordinate and then
collaborate: The more clearly hierarchical a group, the more its cooperative members will
cooperate.
We adopt the measure of hierarchicalness developed by (Mones et al., 2012), because it
bears the mathematical properties we were looking for. However, since this measure is
defined for any arbitrary complete network, we restricted it for our model, i.e., a system
with two layers of players, as follows. Given an unweighted directed graph G = (V,E)
containing a vertex set V with n = |V | number of vertices and an edge set E with M = |E|
number of edges, the local reaching centrality cR(i) of node i was defined as the ratio of
the number of reachable nodes of i through its out-edges, to the total number of nodes
that a node could potentially reach (assuming no self-loop). That is,
cR(i) =
|Si|
n− 1 ,
where Si = {j ∈ V |0 < dout(i, j) < ∞} is the set of nodes that have nonzero but finite
out-distances from node i. And the general reaching centrality GRC(G) of graph G is
the normalized sum of all nodes’ local reaching centrality by the maximum local reaching
centrality:
GRC(G) =
1
n− 1
∑
i∈V
[
cmaxR − cR(i)
]
, (1)
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where cmaxR denotes the largest local reaching centrality in the network. In other words,
when GRC = 1 and the structure is the most hierarchical, the graph would have only one
node–the leader–with nonzero local reaching centrality to all others when others have no
out-edge at all. The structure, therefore, represents the (apparent) hierarchy in Mark’s
model with the highest possible hierarchical score.
Here, to keep generalizing the GRC to two-level groups of nodes, we consider that the play-
ers at the top level, however many, have control over others at the bottom and, therefore,
each at top has an out-edge toward every other at the bottom. The structures studied in
the present research thus become networks, and we define the hierarchicalness Hn(x) of
this kind of two-level cooperation structures with group size n and x players at the top
level using the GRC of network G. That is,
Hn(x) =
{
(n−x)·n−x
n−1
n−1 =
(
n−x
n−1
)2
if 0 < x 6 n
0 if x = 0.
(2)
Notice here that, when 0 < x 6 n, eq. (2) applies eq. (1) to a two-level network with x
players at the top level. In this case, cmaxR =
n−x
n−1 because players at the top show maximum
reachability to n−x nodes at the bottom, who do not have this reachability. Moreover, when
x = 0 and everyone is at the bottom, we set Hn(0) = 0 to represent the lack of leadership
in the group. Readers may consult Figure 1 for an illustration of all group structures and
their corresponding H values that a group with size n = 5 can have. Specifically, in the
two extreme cases in the figure where there is no player at the top (subplot (a)) or every
node is at the top (subplot (f)), H = 0. These two cases demonstrate that, when every
node is equal in status, there is zero hierarchy/hierarchicalness in the network. In addition,
notice that when x = 1, the H value becomes 1, the highest among all scenarios. This thus
represents the clear hierarchical structure formed in Mark’s EVG. Finally and critically,
except for the special case of x = 0, for which we stipulate its H = 0, Hn(x) is a decreasing
function of x, as required by our conceptual analysis above. Put differently, this decreasing
trend suffices that the more leaders at the top level (x), the less apparently hierarchical
the commanding system (H). Readers may also refer to Figure 2, which shows the Hn(x)
functions with different cases of n and x. For these cases, x is defined to be less or equal
to the group size n, and it can be seen that, again, Hn(x) always takes the value between
0 and 1.
Given its useful mathematical properties, Hn(x) is used as the proxy to the probability
that a status cooperator would contribute to the group. By so doing, as explained above,
we make Mark’s model a special case of ours, setting the most and the least hierarchical
extreme scenarios of our model. Specifically, given a group of size n and x players at the
top level, let Hn(x) also be the probability of a status cooperator to contribute in any group
structure emerging from the prepay communication. As such, if there is only one player
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signaling their interest in higher status and, thus, rise to the top, all status cooperators
will contribute, that is, with a probability Hn(1) = 1, as in Mark’s model. On the other
hand, if there is no player at the top level, all status cooperators will not contribute, that
is, with a probability Hn(0) = 0, again as in Mark’s model. Together, these two special
cases then cover the cases Mark discusses. Beyond these, the group structure in our model
can also have any number of leaders, so we are able to delineate the cooperation process
wherein there is any arbitrary number of players in the leader role.
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Figure 1: Illustration of H5(x), x = 0, 1, · · · 5.
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Figure 2: Values of Hn(x), for n = 0, 1, · · · 10.
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3.2 Random mixing
As mentioned, we follow the overall settings of Mark’s original game and only modify the
process of preplay communication and the corresponding contribution of status cooperators
(SC in Mark’s paper, now we use C). The determination of groups and the population
dynamics remain the same along with the evolution. Therefore, our changes to Mark’s
model should have merely affected its expected payoffs for the status cooperator W (C)
and the defector W (D) within one iteration. Everything in-between iterations holds. As
such, below, we focus onW (C) andW (D) first, and then analyze the corresponding changes
in predicted cooperation as a result of changed expected payoffs.
To illustrate the changes in W (C) and W (D), here we start from a small group of size
n, assuming an unbiased random mixing among cooperators and defectors. When n = 2,
the expressions of the expected payoffs for the status cooperators and defectors are shown
in formula (3) and (4), respectively. With the probability for our protagonist, the status
cooperator, to meet another cooperator being fc and to meet a defector being 1 − fc, in
equation (3), the first and the second line are the expected payoff for a status cooperator
meeting another cooperator and a defector, respectively. Particularly, there are three
terms in the first line of equation (3); they in turn represent the situations where the
focal cooperator meets another cooperator while there are 2, 0, or 1 player at the top
level. As a result, when all players (i.e., 2) or no player is leaders, no status cooperator
contributes, and each of them takes c back. By contrast, when there is 1 and only leader
in the group–the special case of Hn(1)–every status cooperator contributes equally and
receives b equally. Moreover, the two terms of the second line, in turn, represent the case
wherein the status cooperator meets a defector, does not go to the top level themself, and
hence not contribute, and the case wherein the cooperator goes to the top and contributes.
Notice that in the latter scenario, the contribution b will be shared by the two players in
the group since the defector does not contribute.
W (C) = fc ·
{(
2
2
)(
1
2
)2(2− 1
2
)0
· c+
(
2
0
)(
1
2
)0(2− 1
2
)2
· c+
(
2
1
)(
1
2
)2(2− 1
2
)1
· b
}
+ (1− fc) ·
{(
1
0
)(
1
2
)0(2− 1
2
)1
· c+
(
1
1
)(
1
2
)1(2− 1
2
)1
· b
2
}
(3)
Turning to the expected payoff for the defector, here we express it in equation (4) in that,
whether the defector meets a status cooperator or another defector, he always keeps his
cost c–the first term in the equation. Therefore we only need to focus on whether they can
get additional shares of b. In the current case of n = 2, the defector would only obtain
the benefit b when meeting a cooperator who goes to the top level (therefore contributes).
This is the second term in the line.
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}
(4)
Now, generalizing the equations, the hierarchicalness function Hn(x) joins in to form the
payoffs for a larger group size n. Notice that x = 1 is always a special case. Here, the
status hierarchy is apparent and all cooperators contribute. The other special case is that
all status cooperators are at the same level, either at the top or the bottom. In this case, no
cooperator contributes. Accordingly, below are the the expected payoffs for the cooperator
and the defector when n = 3, in equation (5) and (6), respectively.
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The first three lines in equation (5) represent the situation in which a status cooperator
meets two other status cooperators, lines 4 to 6 represent the situation in which the coop-
erator meets one cooperator and one defector, and the last line represents the situation in
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which all others are defectors. Here, we focus on the first three lines as the rest is obtained
following the same calculation. That is, the three terms in the first line are the special
cases: In order, all cooperators become leaders, none of them does, and exactly one among
them goes to the top level. Further, lines 2 and 3 together show the case where two status
cooperators go to the top level yet one does not, i.e., x = 2. Here, one needs to consider
two different scenarios: If the focal cooperation does not contribute, they can keep c and
obtain extra portions of b depending on the number of players who contribute. In other
words, though a cooperator to start, this player acts as a defector in the end, given the
probability 1−H3(2) “not” to follow the lead. This probability is always 0 in Mark’s model
because of 1−H3(1) = 0, but does not have to be so in ours. Consequently, the focal player
can take k3 shares of b if there are k cooperators who end up contributing. For example,
the last term in line 3 expresses the scenario that one status cooperator contributes and
the other two do not, therefore the protagonist obtains b3 and the rest of the equation was
derived following the same rationale.
On the other hand, equation (6) is the expected payoff for the defector when n = 3. Note
that, again, a defector can always take back c. They then obtains additional fractions
of b if they meets two cooperators–with probability f2c (the first two lines)–or one status
cooperator–with probability 2fc(1−fc) (the last line). Specifically, the first term inside the
part following f2c represents that exactly one status cooperator becomes the leader, so both
status cooperators contribute. Line 2 represents the scenario where both status cooperators
become leaders, and therefore, each of them has a probability H3(2) to contribute. In this
case, the first term of line 2 expresses that one cooperator contributes and the other does
not, and the second term shows both of them do. As a result, the focal defector obtains
b
3 and
2b
3 of benefits, respectively. The last line then follows the same rationale as in the
prior analysis.
Finally, the expected payoffs for a status cooperator and a defector in a general case of
arbitrary n are identified in equations (7) and (8), respectively. To construct the equations,
we aggregated the payoff that a focal player obtains based on three quantities: (i) the
number of status cooperators in the group, (ii) the number of status cooperators who
become leaders, and (iii) the number of status cooperators who end up contributing to the
group. Together, the expected payoff of the player can be expressed with a triple summation
of the three quantities, denoted with dummy variables i, j, and k, corresponding to the
quantities of (i), (ii), and (iii). Here, it might be worth noting that (ii) depends on (i)
and (iii) depends on them both. Consequently, the first two lines of equation (7) describe
the scenarios in which the focal status cooperator does not contribute and takes back c,
whereas the last two lines describe the scenarios in which they take portions of b depending
on quantities (i), (ii), and (iii). On the other hand, equation (8) indicates that the defector
always keeps c with extra shares of b similarly depending on (i), (ii), and (iii).
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Validating the general equations (7) and (8), we further built an agent-based simulation (see
Appendix for the code) of our EVG. As shown in Figure 3, we compared the analytical and
the simulated predictions of the internal equilibrium–i.e., the cost-to-benefit ratio c/b that
makes W (C) = W (D)–of groups with different sizes n and fractions of status cooperators
fc. A dot in the figure is an average of 100,000 simulations of a given pair of n and
fc, and the lines are the analytical predictions of their same-color dots. As can be seen,
the equations that based the predicted lines–equations (7) and (8)–yielded nearly perfect
matches with the simulations, bolstering the validity of our formal model. In addition,
note that above a line, the cost becomes higher and W (D) > W (C). Therefore status
cooperators will decrease in number in the next iteration of the population dynamics. By
contrast, below a line, the cost is lower and W (D) < W (C). Therefore cooperators will
increase in the next iteration.
Having established the model, subsequently, this section examines our main research ques-
tion about the evolutionary emergence of cooperation against defection in hierarchical
groups that are allowed to have multiple leaders. As does Mark, we first present results
of the analysis of the cost-to-benefit range wherein status cooperation is a stable evolu-
tionary strategy in social dilemmas. To determine the range, we searched for the upper
and the lower bound for cooperation to remain stable, following the reasoning in Mark’s
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Figure 3: Comparison of simulations and analytics for different group size n. Dots and
lines represent simulation and analytical results respectively
paper. Specifically, our multi-leader model would not change the lower bound that Mark
obtained, because only one status cooperator would be placed in a group without any other
cooperator and multi-leader structure is simply impossible. This made the lower bound
of the cost-to-benefit ratio 1n as in Mark’s work. Specifically, if the ratio is smaller than
1
n , b becomes too large relative to c to keep the game a dilemma: Cooperation will al-
ways outperform defection regardless of whom cooperators interact with and how the two
interact.
Moreover, to investigate the upper bound of the cost-to-benefit range that makes coopera-
tion a stable strategy in a social dilemma–that is, the conditions under which that fc = 1 is
stable–we again followed the approach taken by Mark. That is, we considered a population
of status cooperators and then replace one of them with a defector. If these cooperators’
expected payoff in the original homogeneous group is larger than that for the invading
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defector, it is said that cooperation is an evolutionarily stronger and hence stable strategy
against defection. Conversely, if it is expected that payoffs accrue faster for the invading
defector than for the group of cooperators, the defector will eventually take over the group.
Mathematically, this conceptual analysis means to first compute a status cooperator’s pay-
off under fc = 1. If it is larger than a defector’s payoff under fc =
n−1
n , then cooperation
is stable. Accordingly, we plugged these condition in equations (7) and (8) to find the
boundary of c/b.
As shown in Figure 4, although sharing the same lower bound, Mark’s and our model do not
have the same upper bound: Our upper bound of c/b–derived numerically using equations
(7) and (8)–is higher and, indeed, much higher for small groups than is Mark’s. In other
words, the region of the cost-to-benefit ratio in which status cooperation is a stable strategy
in social dilemmas is wider when multi-leader hierarchy is permitted than when it is not,
and this is specifically caused by heightened difficulty for defectors to invade cooperators,
as opposed to the lowered difficulty for cooperators to invade defectors. Consequently,
the results indicate that our modifying Mark’s EVG to include unapparent hierarchy less
effective in maneuvering group members into cooperation actually makes cooperation more
but not less protected against defection. Indeed, we examine the region of c/b in larger
groups, because it can be derived analytically that the upper bound of Mark’s model will
approach 0 and, thus, eliminate the region all together as n goes to infinity. As shown
in Figure 5, even though we also found that the upper bound of our model seemingly
approaches 0 as n goes to infinity as does Mark’s, the stability region of cooperation under
our multi-leader EVG still seems wider than that under Mark’s single-leader EVG.
Having derived that cooperation can be stable and, thus, may emerge in evolution, we
now turn to a critical factor that Mark reports affects the emergence of cooperation: the
cooperator-to-defector ratio in groups fc. In 6, using simulated results, we plot the cost-
to-benefit ratio c/b that makes W (C) = W (D), against fc when an arbitrary n = 10, to
illustrate how fc changes the dynamics and relative strength of status cooperation and
defection. Each dot is an average of 100,000 simulations. Again, as in Figure 3, the
region above dots of the same color represents the space where defectors are expected to
outperform cooperators in a round of the game, whereas the region below represents the
space where the situation reverses. Further, to compare these dynamics in single-leader
groups to that in multi-leader ones, we plot the dots of our EVG as well as Mark’s. Here,
it might be worth noting that there are two but not one line of dots for Mark’s model. It is
because we see two slightly different scenarios from Mark’s reasoning; both are interesting
and useful in gauging the effects of multi-leader structures. In particular, the game could
also be set up so that, whenever there are multiple cooperators signaling willingness to take
the leader role in the initial round of leader selection, showing the group’s preference for a
status difference, the selection repeats until the wish is realized and a leader is agreed on
(scenario 1). By contrast, a single-leader game could be set up in the way that whenever
there is more than one cooperator nominated to be the leader in a round of nomination,
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Figure 4: Cooperation is a stable strategy in social dilemmas. Our model and Mark’s
model have the same lower bound. The upper bound in our model (shown in red dots and
lines) is larger than in Mark’s (shown in black dots and lines).
the nomination starts over entirely and the process may end up producing no leader at all
(scenario 2). That is, once begun, the process does not fall back to the no-leader case, and
this is what Mark’s model equation implies.
Combing our model with the two potential interpretations of Mark’s work, 6 then reveals
some novel effects of multi-leader hierarchy. In the figure, it can be seen that the equilib-
rium state W (C) = W (D) in which multi-leader structures are permitted sits in between
the situations where they are not permitted and simply forgot and where they are not di-
rectly used but still help guarantee a later single-leader structure. Here, for the comparison
between our model and the model “with memory,” it is anticipated that our multi-leader
game relatively suppresses cooperation to defection–its line of dots is lower–because here
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Figure 5: Cooperation is a stable strategy in social dilemmas for large n. Our model and
Mark’s model have the same lower bound. The upper bound in our model (shown in red
dots and lines) is larger than in Mark’s (shown in black dots and lines).
the single-leader game can be effectively thought of as a multi-leader game with no dis-
count on the probability to cooperate. In other words, whenever there are cooperators
nominated in the initial round of selection, all cooperators contribute with no hesitation
later. Accordingly, the more cooperators in a group, the more likely one of them will
show the interest to lead and then build a fully collaborative team of cooperators. On the
other hand, not only may the likelihood to contribute be discounted in our EVG; the more
cooperators are there, the more likely a multi-leader group will surface and reduce group
contribution.
What is intriguing here, consequently, is the finding that cooperation in our EVG outper-
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Figure 6: Comparison of simulations of the boundary W (C) = W (D) as fc increases when
n = 10.
forms that in a game in which multi-leader hierarchy is simply ignored–the “no-memory”
model. Because of insisting on reaching a clear consensus about leadership, this kind of
single-leader model would require all multi-leader structures to rearrange, in the fact that
the selection of leaders may well generate no status hierarchy in the end and make every-
one a defector. From this perspective, allowing attenuated parallel leadership is then a
worthy compromise. Although the full contribution is not extracted there, at least some
of it is, and this is better than nothing. For theory, the present paper therefore elaborates
on Mark’s investigation, and documents not only why hierarchy may exist, but also why
its leadership is sometimes distributed to multiple: It may be worth it.
Finally, focusing on our multi-leader EVG, 6 suggests that there may be an optimal level
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of fc; it is not the higher the better for the ration in terms of bolstering cooperation, not
as Mark’s equation (i.e., the model with memory) predicts. In Figures X as well as 3, we
report that even if the W (C) = W (D) lines of dots are in general in an ascending trend
as fc increases, all lines of dots slightly yet consistently drop lower when fc approaches
1. The phenomenon echos with our above reasoning that, when there are too many co-
operators competing for leadership in a group, forcing the group to choose more leaders
and compromise (collaborative) members’ willingness to contribute, cooperators in effect
become partial defectors, and that creates more harm than good. To put it differently,
even if there are few defectors in a group, cooperators may still break the team among
themselves, as can be seen in everyday experiences (Chrobot-Mason et al., 2009). This
result of the current study consequently extends Mark’s work and helps shed light one why
not everyone in this world today behaves collectively and collaboratively and why that may
in fact make the society function better.
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3.3 Assortative mixing
Following closely with Mark, in this section, we keep generalizing our model to explore
how it behaves under non-random, assortative mixing. In Mark’s original paper, he reports
that a status cooperator may be able to reversely invade a population of defectors with the
help of enough assortativity, because assortative mixing unequally protects and, therefore,
favors cooperative strategies. Following this analysis, we adopted the assortative mixing
rules developed in Mark’s paper, that is, the selection of the first individual of a group
is unbiased and random yet the successive members of the group are biasedly selected
depending on the assortativity parameter τ . To construct this analysis in our model,
the only change to make lay in the rate of meeting a cooperator fc. We thus derived
the expected payoffs for a status cooperator and a defector in a multi-leader model with
assortative mixing in equations (9) and (10) as follows.
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Equations (9) and (10) may look complex, yet they are merely incremental from the general
random-mixing equations (7) and (8). As mentioned, only terms related to the fraction of
status cooperators fc are modified, and there are only two such terms. Specifically, (fc)
n−1
in the first term of the first line of equation (7) is substituted with(
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n
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n
)
fc
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in equation (9). The 1n term here is the probability for a focal player to be chosen as the
first member and then n−1 others to be chosen as status cooperators. On the other hand,
the n−1n is the probability for another status cooperator to be the first member and n− 1
others including the focal player to be cooperators.
Further, in the first and the third line of equation (7), the term
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Here, the first two lines of the expression represent the scenario wherein the first member
of a group is a status cooperator. The term with 1i+1 is the probability for the focal
cooperator to be the first member and i others to be chosen as status cooperators; the
term with ii+1 is the probability for another status cooperator to be the first member and
n − 1 others including the focal player to be cooperators. Lastly, the third line of the
expression describes the case in which the first member of a group is a defector and they
meet i+ 1 status cooperators including the focal player.
With aforementioned modifications, equation (9) was then obtained. Importantly, when
τ = 0, i.e., random mixing, this equation (9) reduces to equation (7) as expected. Similarly,
equation (10) was obtained by changing the terms related to fc in equation (8). The term
in first line of (8)
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The first line of the expression shows the scenario wherein the first member of a group is
a cooperator and they meet i− 1 other status cooperators, and the second and third lines
express the scenario in which the first member of a group is a defector. The term with
1
n−i is the probability for the defector to be the first member with i others being status
cooperators, and the term with n−i−1n−i is the probability for another defector to be the first
member with i other in the group being cooperators. Following these changes, equation
(10) was subsequently formed. Again, when τ = 0, this equation (10) reduces to equation
(8).
As before, to validate equations (9) and (10), we built an agent-based simulation of our
multi-leader model, now with the possibility of assortative mixing (see Appendix for the
code). Following the same simulation procedure, Figure ?? shows the analytics and the sim-
ulations of assortatively mixed groups, in their cost-to-benefit ratio c/b against the fraction
of status cooperators fc given internal equilibrium. Different from the prior random-mixing
analysis, here we fixed group size n = 10 and instead color-coded τ . The results indicate
that equations (9) and (10) yield nearly perfect matches with the simulations.
By contrast, small group sizes do so almost uniformly across different levels of fc.
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Figure 7: Comparison of simulations and analytics of the lines W (C) = W (D) with differ-
ent mixing ratio τ . Dots and lines represent simulation and analytical results respectively
Now, given that our analytical equations match the agent-based simulations, we used the
equations to investigate the behavior of our model. The results in Figure 8 suggest that,
across group sizes, the internal equilibrium between cooperation and defection increases as
τ increases, supporting Mark’s general observation that assortativity protects cooperation
against defection at any given level of the cooperator-to-defector ratio. Looking closely, our
model further shows that the ability of assortativity to heighten this equilibrium, though
still existing, decays as fc increases. Superficially, Mark’s work would anticipate a similar
phenomenon, because when most members in a group are cooperators, there should be
little need to shield them from defectors. Assortativity becomes useless in short. However,
diverging from this interpretation of the findings, not only does our model indicate that
assortativity’s contribution to the evolutionary strength of cooperation against defection
wanes at high fc; we found it to reduce so much to the extent that the common benefit
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of high fc is compromised and even reversed. For instance, as can be seen in the figure,
when a group is fully assortative, c/b in fact decreases as fc increases–that is, the more
cooperators in an assortative group relative to defectors, the less cooperation will evolve
against defection.
Here, we believe the cause of this trade-off between τ and fc can be traced back to the
fact that our model allows multi-leader structures, whereas Mark’s model does not. As
mentioned in the above discussion of random-mixing results, our multi-leader hierarchy
comes with a price: It attenuates group members’ willingness to contribute and makes
cooperators partial defectors. As a result, when the group is large (i.e., n is big) and most of
its members are cooperators (i.e., fc is big), multiple leaders would likely emerge among the
cooperators, and the group can effectively be deemed as having more but not fewer defectors
than when there are fewer leaders. Non-randomly pairing these partial defectors with one
another–assorting the group–subsequently contradicts the idea of protecting cooperators
from defectors; cooperators are themselves, defectors, here. Indeed, this detrimental effect
of high fc explains why there is a backfiring effect reported above that leads to the inverted
U-shape equilibrium for randomly mixed structures yet no inverted U observed here. This
is not about the eventual changing of the direction of the influence of fc, either changing
up or down, but about its consistent risk to mitigate cooperation when being too high,
either for non-assortative or assortative groups. In summary, the present paper reports
that assortativity not merely independently adds to the effect of the cooperator-to-defector
ratio; the two interact. This changes the very dynamics of the evolution of cooperation
in groups, where both assortativity and large numbers of cooperators can jeopardize the
emergence of cooperation.
Lastly, we investigated the effects of assortative mixing on the range of cost-to-benefit
ration c/b for cooperation to be a stable strategy in social dilemmas. The result is shown
in Figure 9. Again, the lower bound of the social dilemma is the same as for randomly
mixed groups, independent of τ . For the upper bounds, we added the cases of different
assortative levels τ . Here, the upper bound is the same as the one we obtained in the
random-mixing case when τ = 0. When τ increases, the upper bound also increases. One
can therefore see the effect of assortative mixing on promoting cooperative behavior again,
although the effect might not seem substantial in size.
4 General Discussion
Using evolutionary game theory, Mark (2018) provided a pioneering evolutionary account
for how group cooperation may benefit from status hierarchy. With both analytical and
numerical examination, we present am extension to a single-leadership model by gauging
the hierarchicalness of these multiple-leader cases and then estimating the level of coop-
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eration mobilized by the leader-“s.” We show that, when these multiple-leader scenarios
are taken into account and properly handled, the emergence of cooperation against the
invasion of defection in fact seems stronger than predicted by Mark’s original calculation.
In other words, our work not only generalizes Mark’s model over the continuous spectrum
of hierarchicalness, but also conveys an optimistic message regarding how group coopera-
tion may go hand-in-hand with status hierarchy. Indeed, to verify the analytical results of
our proposed model, we developed an agent-based model, ran computer simulation using
the model over tens of thousands of random replications, and demonstrate that the results
of simulation well match those of our calculation. Since we have publicized the simula-
tion code (programmed in MATLAB) in an open repository in support of full scientific
transparency and sharing, the agent-based model as well as its analytical counterpart fur-
ther opens the door for future follow-up attempts to replicate and to extend our current
findings.
4.1 Empirical basis of the current model
Despite being a theoretical and computational paper, the present research is motivated
and supported by empirical evidence and experiences. First, it is trivial to say that people
do live in a world with multi-leader organizations; they often if not always collaborate
with one another in such environments. This fact, besides the questionable calculation
of Mark’s paper, serves as the reason that we conducted the current investigation. And
we do find cooperation possible and conditionally stable when there are more than one
leader in a group in the model, as it is in the real world. Notably, our model shows
that, though still possible, the more individuals competing for leadership in a group, the
less stable cooperation is a behavioral strategy against defection. This is in line with the
many scientific studies reporting that, say, the marginal benefit of having star investors
on an investment team not only decreases when the number of such individuals increases.
With the rising challenge of finding consensus among high-status group members, having
talented investors on the team eventually backfires and reduces team profits (Groysberg
et al., 2011). That is, the group members would in fact be better off if not working together.
Anecdotally, many might also remember the surprising bumpy start of the Miami Heat of
their 2010-11 NBA season when LeBron “King” James first joined with two other all-stars
on the team, Dwyane Wade and Chris Bosh. Without having played together enough,
the “Big Three” seemed to lead the team independently as three individuals as opposed
to working as one unit, resulting in many lost games. Indeed, commentators regularly
attribute the Heat’s successes in winning the championship in the following years to the
three’s finally finding a way to, literally, play at different positions in one and only united
system, again implying that the more “independent” leaders, the less cooperation may
achieve.
In addition to predicting what people experience in everyday life, our model relies on
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assumptions in line with everyday experiences too Particularly, we assume that the more
group members, the less they would want to be the leader. This follows from the established
bystander effect in social psychology such as that shown in Darley and Latane´’s (Darley and
Latane´, 1968) research. In this classic series of experiments, Darley and Latane´ demonstrate
that study participants were less likely to speak up and report potential emergencies–fire in
the laboratory for example–when there were more participants in the lab. In other words,
even if presumably everyone wanted to get out of the fire, when the group was large, few
would emerge to lead the rest. By contrast, it was found easy for a person to lead themself
and simply leave the room. Moreover, we build our major contribution to the literature–
that cooperation is possible not only in single–but also in a multi-leader hierarchy–on the
premise that the more leaders in the group, the less likely the rest would follow. The design
is in accordance with the long-standing Competing Values Framework of leadership, which
states that the leadership of an organization often has competing goals. The goals can be
of a single leader and need to be reconciled within themself, or of different leaders and
need to reconcile among themselves. Either way, if the goals cannot be integrated within
or between leaders, the resources of the organization would be divided into the goals and
thereof used less effective for all goals. For instance, it is reported that in a politically
polarized country–the U.S. in this study–people tend to be less cooperative with those who
follow a different political ideology even on non-political daily economic issues (McConnell
et al., 2018). As a potential result, human resources in general in the country would be
arranged along the party line and, as in our model, inefficiently organized to achieve the
common good for all. From here, consequently, not only does our theorizing stem from
empirically bolstered bases; another way to conceptualize our work is to think of high-
status agents in our model not as leaders, but as leaderships. Instead of treating them as
individual persons who may or may not hold contradictory opinions, we define the agents
as paradoxical opinions that the group has to juggle and allocate resourceful cooperation
between, thus opening the implications of the current paper for information processing and
integration within groups and even within individuals’ minds.
4.2 Implications
One important contribution of the current paper is that we go one step further to show that
cooperation can be a stable strategy even if the leadership in a group is shared by many
and thus attenuated. For theory, we hold that this advance well increases the realism of our
model compared to Mark’s, as organizational leadership is often shared than monopolized
in the wild. Even if it is held by only one person in some cases–say, of presidential power–
the process of forming such clear consensus is commonly costly and, indeed, painful. Just
think about how a politician funnels through the countless public debates and votes to
survive their party nomination to first become the candidate, and then more debates and
votes to finally win the one presidential seat. All these hurdles exist exactly because there
31
can only be one president. Ignoring the costs resulting from this kind of challenge in the
leader selection processes, especially in single-leader structures such as those in Mark’s
model, consequently, seriously compromises the applicability of the model. Putting the
hidden costs back in sight as in our model, on the other hand, serves as a significant
step closer to formal modeling the negotiation of leadership in groups and–in the present
paper–its influences on cooperation among group members. Finally and importantly, we
demonstrate that cooperation can emerge from multi-leader models as well, even if the
leader’s authority is divided among multiple individuals, just as in the real world; people
regularly if not always work with one another for the common good, under the direction
not merely of one, but also of many (Dust and Ziegert, 2016). The validity of our analysis is
therefore bolstered by daily observations; its future generalizability is then laid out.
As for generalizability, nevertheless, we would like to point out one implication from the
present work that we believe still needs future scrutiny: that cooperation under hierarchy
may be more stable than predicted by Mark’s original model. On the one hand, it is encour-
aging to see cooperation thrive. This is what we hope for humanity and what scientifically
aligns with everyday experiences–people do cooperate from time to time in a multi-leader
world. On the other hand, we are uncertain about jumping to the conclusion that coopera-
tion may emerge more easily in a universe where leadership can be divided into groups–that
is, our model–than when it cannot be–Mark’s model. The reason is we ourselves find that
cooperation is more stable and stronger against defection when the hierarchy is clearer
with fewer leaders at the top sharing the authority. This is tested analytically as well as
numerically and is indeed in line with Mark’s theorizing. As such, following his erroneous
calculation by which all structures beginning with multiple leaders ended up having exactly
one leader, all multi-leader, less-cooperation-supporting hierarchies in our model would be
treated as single-leader and, therefore, fully-cooperation-supporting in Mark’s model. Con-
sequently, Mark’s original prediction should have rendered cooperation more but not less
stable than are our mathematical as well as agent-based prediction, which accords among
themselves. Here, we are reluctant to chase the discrepancy down the rabbit hole; it is
not the aim of the current work. We are however welcome future endeavors on the general
issue of the effect of attenuated leadership on cooperation, hoping our model and computer
code fully publicized help with the investigation.
4.3 Limitations and future directions
Multiple directions can be considered to extend our current work. First, both our and
Mark’s models have merely considered the 2-level hierarchy (with only the top and the
bottom level) but clearly, social hierarchy in real life takes various other forms. Intuitively,
for instance, the most hierarchical structure is the linear system, wherein the top actor
outranks the second, who in turn outranks the third, and so on and so forth until the
bottom position; this system can easily have more than two levels. Further, however,
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prevalent linear systems are in the dominance structure of social animals (Shizuka and
McDonald, 2012), they still do not characterize all human status structures. For one, in
many contests such as those of sports, while high-ranked contestants by definition win more
in a tournament, they may still lose to low-ranked others from time to time. In ethology,
researchers have also found cases (e.g., gorillas) where dominance relations in the group are
non-transitive in the sense that actor A dominates B and B dominates C, but C somehow
turns back to dominate A, thus forming a cycle structure in the group. Together, future
work may continue to the literature by investigating the extent to which these diverse
hierarchical structures ameliorate or deteriorate the evolution of group cooperation and,
importantly, how the structures affect cooperation.
In terms of the mechanisms through which hierarchy may benefit cooperation, we see two
lines of research that may shed light on this investigation. First, besides examining the
within-group competition between status cooperators and defectors, the level of analysis
can be shifted up to the group level to focus on how, for instance, the cultural contexts
embedding groups with different levels of emphasis on status egalitarianism influence co-
operation within groups. Social norms are arguably one of the strongest propellants for
the evolution of group cooperation (Herrmann et al., 2008). Combining the cultural evo-
lution models (Henrich et al., 2012), future modeling efforts can, therefore, examine the
effects of larger social norms on both status hierarchy and group cooperation. This line
of investigation will extend our current work to the co-evolution of social hierarchy, group
cooperation, and culture.
Further, one may dig deeper down into individual persons’ minds to study the psychology
that associates being in a hierarchical situation at the moment with the decision to or
not to act cooperatively. In the management and the organizational psychology literature,
scholars have shown that, although at the moment subordinates may follow orders and
cooperate with one another regardless, the motivating reasons that they follow orders still
have a significant impact on whether the cooperation would persist in the future. For
instance, if one contributes to their group, feeling autonomous in doing so, cooperation
may be more likely to continue than it may when one feels forced (Maner and Case, 2016).
Even if similarly willing, those who approach the decision from an exchange-orientated
perspective have been further found to be motivated to contribute more easily yet, in the
meanwhile, be demotivated more easily as well and “pull out” more quickly in future, than
are those approach the decision of cooperation from a communal-orientated perspective
(Thompson and DeHarpport, 1998).
Here, especially pertinent to our present research on leader hierarchy is the evidence that
followers’ psychology often reflects the psychology of their leaders. For example, the ex-
change orientation of subordinates can be caused by the transactional leadership of their
supervisors. By contrast, subordinates’ communal orientation can result from their super-
visors’ transformational leadership (Wang et al., 2005). Together in the terminology of
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EVG, it is hence the case that the psychology underlying cooperation behavior influences
the strength of this behavioral strategy for shielding itself from the invasion of defection
and, therefore, its stability over the long run. When combined with the model proposed in
the current paper, this direction for future work may then broaden the scope of leader “psy-
chology” types in the formal modeling of cooperation in hierarchical organizations.
Finally, corresponding to the great theoretical variety of hierarchy is the large literature
on the methodology of measuring hierarchicalness. While one can always try a different
measure to make their model perform better, not all of the alternatives would work equally
well. For instance, as does Mark’s model, our model does not take into account informa-
tion about individuals differentials in the social hierarchy. This makes the first kind of
hierarchicalness measure discussed in section two (i.e., social hierarchy and cooperation)
becomes inapplicable. Even if other methods are logically applicable–take the measure by
(Krackhardt, 1994) for example–while the measure shares a similar idea with the method
developed by (Mones et al., 2012) and adopted by the present paper, only the latter but
not the former distinguishes the hierarchicalness of a structure–say, one that has one leader
and n− 1 subordinates–from the hierarchicalness of the structure’s reverse form–one that
has n − 1 leaders and one subordinate. In other words, Kackhardt’s method would treat
the two structures as equally hierarchical, which is against Mark’s theorizing and clearly
counter-intuitive, since the single-leader structure is commonly deemed more hierarchical
than the single-subordinate one. In contrast, the measure by (Mones et al., 2012) works
better in pinpointing this asymmetry between the two example structures, and thus is more
suitable for the purpose of our work. Overall, then, future investigations would want to
be mindful of both the theory and the methodology, as well as of their fit with each other.
Just because our choice of the hierarchicalness measure functions well in our research does
not mean it will do the same elsewhere. We encourage researchers to explore their options
in the future.
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Figure 8: W (C) = W (D) lines in different settings of group size n and assortative level τ .
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5 Appendix
5.1 Revisit of the average payoff of status cooperators and defectors
In this subsection, we revisit Mark’s original model of the average payoff of status cooper-
ators and defectors. Here in the signaling process, if the group reaches a status hierarchy,
only one individual could be on the top level. If more than one status cooperators go to
the top level, this yields a failed attempt and the group starts its signaling process again.
Note that in this setting, it is possible that during the first attempt there are more than
one status cooperators at the top level. But since this is a failed attempt, later there could
be no status hierarchy, i.e., no individuals at the top level.
Let fc be the ratio of status cooperators in a group, the formula (4a) and (4b) in Mark’s
paper become:
W (C) =
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i
)
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and
W (D) = c+
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Figure 10 and 11 are the comparison of simulations, Mark’s formula, and our formula. We
build and agent-based model for the phase of preplay signaling and payoff determination.
In order to compute expected values of W (C) and W (D), the parameters we choose here
are b = 1 and c = 0.2. Each dot is an average of 100,000 simulations. We can see using
Mark’s formula (4a) and (4b), the prediction gets worse when fc is large. The discrepancy in
Mark’s formula and simulations is not getting smaller as we increase the group size n. Note
that there are still discrepancies for our predictions, but as n increases, the discrepancies
become smaller asymptotically.
5.2 Simulations and analytic codes
All the codes are available on the author’s GitHub account:
https://github.com/waynelee1217/status_cooperation
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Figure 10: Comparison of W(C) by simulating form Mark’s original model using formula
(4a) (left, dashed lines) and our formula (right, solid lines).
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
fc
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
W
(D
)
simulations and Mark's analytics for b = 1, c = 0.2
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
fc
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
W
(D
)
simulations and our analytics for b = 1, c = 0.2
Figure 11: Comparison of W(D) by simulating form Mark’s original model using formula
(4b) (left, dashed lines) and our formula (right, solid lines).
38
References
Bendor, J. and Swistak, P. (2001). The evolution of norms. American Journal of Sociology,
106(6):1493–1545.
Bergstrom, T. C. (2002). Evolution of social behavior: individual and group selection.
Journal of Economic perspectives, 16(2):67–88.
Bolsen, T., Ferraro, P. J., and Miranda, J. J. (2014). Are voters more likely to contribute to
other public goods? evidence from a large-scale randomized policy experiment. American
Journal of Political Science, 58(1):17–30.
Bradley, R. A. and Terry, M. E. (1952). Rank analysis of incomplete block designs: I. the
method of paired comparisons. Biometrika, 39(3/4):324–345.
Burns, J. K., Tomita, A., and Kapadia, A. S. (2014). Income inequality and schizophre-
nia: increased schizophrenia incidence in countries with high levels of income inequality.
International Journal of Social Psychiatry, 60(2):185–196.
Case, C. R. and Maner, J. K. (2014). Divide and conquer: When and why leaders un-
dermine the cohesive fabric of their group. Journal of personality and social psychology,
107(6):1033.
Chase, I. D. (1985). The sequential analysis of aggressive acts during hierarchy formation:
an application of the ‘jigsaw puzzle’approach. Animal Behaviour, 33(1):86–100.
Cheng, J. T., Tracy, J. L., Foulsham, T., Kingstone, A., and Henrich, J. (2013). Two
ways to the top: Evidence that dominance and prestige are distinct yet viable avenues
to social rank and influence. Journal of personality and social psychology, 104(1):103.
Chrobot-Mason, D., Ruderman, M. N., Weber, T. J., and Ernst, C. (2009). The challenge
of leading on unstable ground: Triggers that activate social identity faultlines. Human
Relations, 62(11):1763–1794.
Colley, W. (2002). Colley’s bias free college football ranking method.
Correll, S. J. and Ridgeway, C. L. (2006). Expectation states theory. In Handbook of social
psychology, pages 29–51. Springer.
Darley, J. M. and Latane´, B. (1968). Bystander intervention in emergencies: diffusion of
responsibility. Journal of personality and social psychology, 8(4p1):377.
Dust, S. B. and Ziegert, J. C. (2012). When and how are multiple leaders most effective?
it’s complex. Industrial and Organizational Psychology, 5(4):421–424.
39
Dust, S. B. and Ziegert, J. C. (2016). Multi-leader teams in review: A contingent-
configuration perspective of effectiveness. International Journal of Management Reviews,
18(4):518–541.
Eslen-Ziya, H. and Erhart, I. (2015). Toward postheroic leadership: A case study of gezi’s
collaborating multiple leaders. Leadership, 11(4):471–488.
Fehr, E. and Gintis, H. (2007). Human motivation and social cooperation: Experimental
and analytical foundations. Annu. Rev. Sociol., 33:43–64.
Friedrich, T. L., Vessey, W. B., Schuelke, M. J., Ruark, G. A., and Mumford, M. D. (2009).
A framework for understanding collective leadership: The selective utilization of leader
and team expertise within networks. The Leadership Quarterly, 20(6):933–958.
Gould, R. V. (2002). The origins of status hierarchies: A formal theory and empirical test.
American journal of sociology, 107(5):1143–1178.
Grossman, G. and Baldassarri, D. (2012). The impact of elections on cooperation: Evidence
from a lab-in-the-field experiment in uganda. American journal of political science,
56(4):964–985.
Groysberg, B., Polzer, J. T., and Elfenbein, H. A. (2011). Too many cooks spoil the
broth: How high-status individuals decrease group effectiveness. Organization Science,
22(3):722–737.
Hamman, J. R., Weber, R. A., and Woon, J. (2011). An experimental investigation of
electoral delegation and the provision of public goods. American Journal of Political
Science, 55(4):738–752.
Hechter, M. (1987). Principles of group solidarity berkeley: California u.
Hemingway, H., Nicholson, A., Stafford, M., Roberts, R., and Marmot, M. (1997). The im-
pact of socioeconomic status on health functioning as assessed by the sf-36 questionnaire:
the whitehall ii study. American journal of public health, 87(9):1484–1490.
Henrich, J., Boyd, R., McElreath, R., Gurven, M., Richerson, P. J., Ensminger, J., Alvard,
M., Barr, A., Barrett, C., Bolyanatz, A., et al. (2012). Culture does account for variation
in game behavior. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 109(2):E32–E33.
Herrmann, B., Tho¨ni, C., and Ga¨chter, S. (2008). Antisocial punishment across societies.
Science, 319(5868):1362–1367.
Hobson, E. A. (2019). Differences in social information are critical to understanding ag-
gressive behavior in animal dominance hierarchies. Current Opinion in Psychology.
40
Kollock, P. (1998). Social dilemmas: The anatomy of cooperation. Annual review of
sociology, 24(1):183–214.
Krackhardt, D. (1994). Graph theoretical dimensions of informal organizations, computa-
tional organization theory, l. Computational Organizational Theory, K. Carley, and M.
Prietula, Eds. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associaties, Inc, pages 89–111.
Kuziemko, I., Buell, R. W., Reich, T., and Norton, M. I. (2014). “last-place aversion”: Evi-
dence and redistributive implications. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 129(1):105–
149.
Levi Martin, J. (2009). Formation and stabilization of vertical hierarchies among adoles-
cents: Towards a quantitative ethology of dominance among humans. Social Psychology
Quarterly, 72(3):241–264.
Luo, R., Zhang, L., Huang, J., and Rozelle, S. (2007). Elections, fiscal reform and public
goods provision in rural china. Journal of Comparative Economics, 35(3):583–611.
Maner, J. K. and Case, C. R. (2016). Dominance and prestige: Dual strategies for navigat-
ing social hierarchies. In Advances in experimental social psychology, volume 54, pages
129–180. Elsevier.
Mark, N. P. (2018). Status organizes cooperation: An evolutionary theory of status and
social order. American Journal of Sociology, 123(6):1601–1634.
Martin, J. L. (1998). Structures of power in naturally occurring communities. Social
networks, 20(3):197–225.
Massey, K. (1997). Statistical models applied to the rating of sports teams. Bluefield
College.
McConnell, C., Margalit, Y., Malhotra, N., and Levendusky, M. (2018). The economic
consequences of partisanship in a polarized era. American Journal of Political Science,
62(1):5–18.
Mones, E., Vicsek, L., and Vicsek, T. (2012). Hierarchy measure for complex networks.
PloS one, 7(3).
Nowak, M. A. (2006). Five rules for the evolution of cooperation. science, 314(5805):1560–
1563.
Olken, B. A. (2010). Direct democracy and local public goods: Evidence from a field
experiment in indonesia. American political science review, 104(2):243–267.
Rice, N. (2006). Opportunities lost, possibilities found: Shared leadership and inclusion in
an urban high school. Journal of Disability Policy Studies, 17(2):88–100.
41
Sapolsky, R. M. (2005). The influence of social hierarchy on primate health. Science,
308(5722):648–652.
Sauder, M., Lynn, F., and Podolny, J. M. (2012). Status: Insights from organizational
sociology. Annual Review of Sociology, 38:267–283.
Selznick, P. (2011). Leadership in administration: A sociological interpretation. Quid Pro
Books.
Shizuka, D. and McDonald, D. B. (2012). A social network perspective on measurements
of dominance hierarchies. Animal Behaviour, 83(4):925–934.
Simpson, B. and Willer, R. (2015). Beyond altruism: Sociological foundations of coopera-
tion and prosocial behavior. Annual Review of Sociology, 41:43–63.
Starmans, C., Sheskin, M., and Bloom, P. (2017). Why people prefer unequal societies.
Nature Human Behaviour, 1(4):0082.
Thompson, L. and DeHarpport, T. (1998). Relationships, goal incompatibility, and com-
munal orientation in negotiations. Basic and applied social psychology, 20(1):33–44.
Van Vugt, M. (2006). Evolutionary origins of leadership and followership. Personality and
Social Psychology Review, 10(4):354–371.
Wang, H., Law, K. S., Hackett, R. D., Wang, D., and Chen, Z. X. (2005). Leader-member
exchange as a mediator of the relationship between transformational leadership and
followers’ performance and organizational citizenship behavior. Academy of management
Journal, 48(3):420–432.
Whitmeyer, J. M. (2007). Prestige from the provision of collective goods. Social forces,
85(4):1765–1786.
Willer, R. (2009). Groups reward individual sacrifice: The status solution to the collective
action problem. American Sociological Review, 74(1):23–43.
Xie, W., Ho, B., Meier, S., and Zhou, X. (2017). Rank reversal aversion inhibits redistri-
bution across societies. Nature Human Behaviour, 1(8):1–5.
42
